如果中國武力犯台，台灣如何自衛?-4

The Plan Taiwan Needs to Defend against China- by J. Michael Cole

【編按】:

1946年台灣遭到228事件之浩劫時，美國一駐台官員(George Kerr)講了一句話，『台灣太小無法獨立，但台灣問題則大到不可忽視』(Taiwan is too small to be independent; the Taiwan’s issue is too big to be ignored.)下列為外國記者客觀的、嚴峻的台海情勢。當大部分台灣人天天沈溺於舒適生活當中時，應該停下來思考這個問題，俗話說，『天有不測風雲』。另本文在網路上登在不起眼的國際新聞上，如果你關心台灣事務，希望引起你的注意：

《本文作者簡介》：

J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based senior non-resident fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and an associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC). He recently retired from the Thinking Taiwan Foundation and is a former analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). He has a master’s degree from the Royal Military College of Canada.

      

柯爾先生乃Nottingham(英國)大學中國政策學院，在台北的資深研究員，也是法國研究所專門研究中國問題的副研究員。最近自台灣智庫基金會退休，曾擔任加拿大安全情報中心分析師。他的學歷是加拿大皇家軍事學院碩士

H-20 that may be a ‘flying wing’ design called the Xian H-20. 中國新型轟炸機-這可能是被稱為西安 H-20 飛行翼設計。

     

                                       H-20   重轟炸機                                                                                              B-2重轟炸機   

Certain contributions to the H-20 project were made by Noshir Gowadia, a design engineer who previously worked for Northrop Grumman. He also contributed to the B-2 Spirit development. In 2011, he was convicted to 32 years for selling classified information to China.

一位曾任職於諾斯羅普 · 格魯曼公司的設計工程師-努希爾戈瓦迪亞對H-20有某些貢獻。他還對 B-2 的概想像發展有些貢獻。2011年，因出售分類機密資訊給中國而被判刑32年。
   

China's definition of long-range strategic bomber is a minimum range of 8,000 km (5,000 miles) without refueling and the capacity to carry a payload of more than 10 tons of air-to-ground ammunition.

中國對長程戰略轟炸機的定義是，航程須至少 8000公里（5000 英里）不必加油，並具載荷超過 10 噸的空對地彈藥的能力。

Although Taiwan has expressed interest in Japanese submarine-building capabilities, Tokyo reportedly refused to hold talks on the matter while president Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was in office. The DPP’s closer ties with the Abe government could create dynamics that are more conducive to such dialogue in the near future, especially in the wake of Japan’s failed bid to build submarines for Australia. According to industry sources, while the direct sale of submarines to Taiwan would be out of the question given the impact on Sino-Japanese relations, an alternative option would be for Japan to “retire” and “loan” Japanese technicians during the design phase of the IDS program.

雖然在馬英九時代，臺灣對日本潛艇的造船能力表示興趣，但據說東京拒絕談論此事。民進黨與安倍晉三政府的密切聯繫，在不久的將來，也許可以創建更有利於推動這種對話之契機，尤其是在日本為澳洲潛艇的競標失利之後。業內人士透露，鍳於中日關係之衝擊，雖然直接出售潛艇給臺灣毫無可能，但備選方案是日本可以將"退休"的日本技術人員，"借用"他們給台灣，為台灣提供自製潛艇的程式設計。

Given the substantial expenditures associated with the IDS program and all-volunteer force (see below), added to economic factors that militate against major increases in annual defense spending and the high vulnerability of Taiwan’s air bases to missile/air strikes, it is unlikely that the Tsai administration will embark on a program to acquire or develop a 4.5/5-generation aircraft (e.g., F-35). For the time being, the major programs for the Air Force will therefore likely be limited to the midlife upgrade for its fleet of F-16A/Bs and IDFs.

鑒於自製潛艇計劃(IDS) 與龐大費用支出及全面志願力量（見下文）有所關連，而增加了妨礙年度國防開支的經濟因素，與臺灣的空軍基地極易遭受導彈的空襲，所以蔡英文政府不可能著手獲取或開發 4.5/5 代戰機（例如 F-35)。暫時空軍的主要方案，可能會局限于其艦隊的 F-16A/Bs 和經國式戰機的中生代升級。

  

                                                                                                      F-16A戰鬥機

                  F-35閃電戰鬥機                                                  

 While China’s willingness—and ability—to use force against Taiwan remain uncertain, one area where escalation in the wake of Tsai Ing-wen’s election is likely is in the realm of propaganda, united front work and political warfare. Aware that it is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Taiwan Strait, with support for unification among Taiwanese dipping tosingle-digit territory last year, and facing the prospect of greater resistance in official and semiofficial channels in Taipei, China will conceivably intensify its efforts to isolate Taiwan, undermine its morale and shape the international discourse in its favor. To achieve its objectives, China will continue to rely on the constellation of media, PLA-linked political warfare units, United Front Work organizations, think tanks, academic institutions, NGOs and businesses it has at its disposal. Using an “onion layer” strategy to deceive its opponents, many of the activities in which these “dual-use” bodies engage have a veneer of respectability and legitimacy.

雖然中國使用武力攻打臺灣的意願和能力仍未明朗化，但隨著蔡的當選而昇高的一個可能範圍是，在宣傳、統戰工作、和政治作戰。中國意識到海峽對岸，在民心之争奪戰上它已落敗，而臺灣去年，支持統一的人數已掉到個位數地區，並在臺北官方和半官方管道上，對統一有更大的阻力出現，因此構想上，中國將加强努力孤立臺灣、打擊士氣，和形成對其有利的國際對話機會。為了達到些目標，中國將繼續依靠新聞媒體、與解放軍有關聯的政治作戰單位、統戰工作組織、智庫、學術機構、非政府組織和它所利用的企業。利用剝"洋蔥層"式的戰略來欺騙它的對手，許多這些"兩用"機構所從事的活動，都披上了一層責任與合法性的美麗外衣。

Chinese firms with ostensible links to the PLA have also been expanding their influence abroad through acquisitions and appointments; in many cases, such activities have supported Beijing’s expansionist claims in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, among other issues. Think tanks affiliated with those organizations have also become more proactive in the West and have organized conferences where pro-Beijing views (e.g.,“abandonment” of Taiwan) have been reinforced.

經由併購與任用，與解放軍明顯有關連的中國公司，也在國外不斷地擴大其影響力；在許多情況下，這類活動已支持了北京的擴張主義者們的主張，特別聲明擁有在中國南海和臺灣的主權問題。在西方隸屬于這些組織的智囊團，變得更積極主動，他們也組織了會議，把親北京的看法強化了（例如，"遺棄"臺灣）。

While there is nothing illegal in such endeavors, they nevertheless constitute an orchestrated effort to limit Taiwan’s room to maneuver and to discourage its potential allies through the repetition of threats and insistence on the “inevitability” of unification. Often this is achieved through the cultivation of foreign “experts” who may have traded their principles for the sake of favorable access to Chinese officials and academic institutions.

雖然這樣的努力沒有什麼非法，但他們卻構成了處心積慮地想限制臺灣的迴旋空間，並通過重複的威脅和堅持統一的"必然性"，來阻止台灣潛在的盟友，不敢力挺台灣。通常透過培養外國"專家"，而這些專家為了獲得接近中國官員和學術機構的機會，出賣他們的原則。

Given this, the Tsai administration will have to come up with a robustcounterpropaganda strategy to ensure that Taiwan’s position is not drowned out by Chinese perspectives. It will have to invest in public diplomacy and strengthen its relationship with international media, which historically hasn’t been a strong point of the DPP. This will necessitate greater investment in individuals who have the language skills to interact with a foreign audience and vision on the part of the Tsai administration to empower organizations that operate on the peripheries of government, where they can shape the environment in its favor. Taiwan’s representative offices and embassies abroad, as well as government-organized NGOs such as the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, must also up their game so as to better situate Taiwan within the community of liberal democracies.

有鑒於此，蔡領導的政府必須想出一個強而有力的對抗宣傳之戰略，以確保臺灣的地位，不會因中國一廂情願的想法而被淹沒。台灣將不得不投資於公共外交，加強與國際媒體的關係，因歷史上國際媒體對民進黨尚缺乏強力支持。這將需要更大的投資於培養具有語言溝通技巧的人，使其能與外國觀眾互動，並具蔡當局之視覺，來授權經營政府周邊的機構，在機構中他們可以塑造出有利政府的環境。臺灣代表處和駐海外使館，以及政府組織的非政府機構如臺灣民主基金會，必須提升他們的地位，把臺灣更佳地置於自由民主國家的陣營中。

未完

Justin Lai 編譯

07/04/2016